The present study examined the relationship between left–right discrimination (LRD) performance and handedness, sex and cognitive abilities. In total, 31 men and 35 women – with a balanced ratio of left-and right-handers – completed the Bergen Left–Right Discrimination Test. We found an advantage of left-handers in both identifying left hands and in verifying “left” propositions. A sex effect was also found, as women had an overall higher error rate than men, and increasing difficulty impacted their reaction time more than it (...) did for men. Moreover, sex interacted with handedness and manual preference strength. A negative correlation of LRD reaction time with visuo-spatial and verbal long-term memory was found independently of sex, providing new insights into the relationship between cognitive skills and performance on LRD. (shrink)

This short article aims to reflect on the impacts of Ulrich Beck’s work in Brazilian sociology. Particularly, it will be argued that Beck’s work has had a significant impact on the establishment of the conceptual field of environmental sociology in Brazil. His book Risk Society, for instance, had a great influence – since the late 1980s – among the Brazilian research groups dedicated to the debate on the relationship between society and nature in modern contexts. Although placed in the critical (...) target condition through the years, the notion of risk developed by Beck is still undoubtedly an important pillar in the constitution of the field of socioenvironmental studies at an international level and in Brazil, in particular. (shrink)

Au Cap, le nouvel an est célébré depuis plus d’un siècle et demi par des parades de rue et des compétitions de chœurs et de troupes carnavalesques. Elles rassemblent des milliers de personnes qui, du temps de l’apartheid, avaient été classées dans la catégorie coloured. Ces fêtes du nouvel an sont nées d’usages sociaux de la rue résultant des conditions de vie matérielle dans les quartiers à population majoritairement « métisse » ; la rue devint ainsi non seulement un espace (...) de sociabilité mais un lieu de création contredisant les stéréotypes négatifs attribués aux « métis ». Ces fonctions furent gravement mises en péril par le classement en « zone blanche » de ces quartiers puis par l’interdiction de défiler dans le centre-ville du Cap édictée après 1976. Ces mesures entraînèrent une lutte symbolique pour le droit à l’espace urbain qui ne rejoignit pas directement le combat politique des années 1980 mais exprima, en plus d’une opposition implicite à l’apartheid, l’idée partagée par un grand nombre de « métis » que Le Cap, « Cité-mère » de l’Afrique du Sud, est « leur » ville. (shrink)

The Profession of Ignorance provides a readable discussion in dialogue form of the philosophy of "ignorance" as practiced by Socrates, who claimed a kind of knowledge of ignorance as human wisdom. Martin McAvoy shows that understanding this profession of ignorance is essential to understanding the character of Plato's Socrates. He begins by explaining that to comprehend this concept, Socrates' repeated claim that he is ignorant must be believed. In claiming this ignorance, Socrates claims a kind of knowledge. This knowledge (...) of ignorance is the central paradox of Socrates' wisdom, generating his mission and elenchus. McAvoy presents the concept of thinking as a dialogue between knowledge and ignorance. In this dialogue, one asks as if ignorant, and one answers as if knowing. This very form questions the reality of knowledge. McAvoy questions the nature of knowledge, since it appears that one can not be sure exactly what is knowledge, but can recognize that it exists, though always ignorant of precisely what it is. He acknowledges and utilizes the presence of a double irony, that in an important sense, makes the profession of ignorance sincere. The use of the dialogue form reflects this double irony, and exhibits McAvoy's profession of ignorance as a claim to knowledge, just as in the case of Plato's. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a proof-theoretic characterization of relevant logics including fusion and fission connectives, as well as Ackermann’s truth constant. We achieve this by employing the well-established methodology of labelled sequent calculi. After having introduced several systems, we will conduct a detailed proof-theoretic analysis, show a cut-admissibility theorem, and establish soundness and completeness. The paper ends with a discussion that contextualizes our current work within the broader landscape of the proof theory of relevant logics.

Prominent radical democrats have in recent times shown a vivid interest in the commons. Ever since the publication of Governing the Commons by Elinor Ostrom, the commons have been associated with a self-governing and self-sustaining scheme of production and burdened with the responsibility of carving out an autonomous social space independent from both the markets and the state. Since the commons prove on a small empirical scale that self-governance, far from being a utopian ideal, is and long has been a (...) lived reality, a few authors have attempted to turn them into the conceptual matrix of their own account of radical democracy. Negri and Hardt, on one hand, Laval and Dardot, on the other, have jointly coined the term ‘the common’ (in the singular) to suggest that the self-governance quintessential to the commons could be turned into a general democratic principle. Though this is an attractive theoretical prospect, I will contend that it fails to account for an important contradiction between the two theoretical frameworks it connects. Whereas the governance of the commons depends on harmonious cooperation between all stakeholders which in turn relies on a strong sense of belonging to a shared community, radical democracy is highly suspicious of any attempt to build a totalizing community and constantly emphasizes the decisive role of internal agonistic conflicts in maintaining a vibrant pluralism. I will further contend that the short-sightedness of radical democrats on this issue may be partially explained by the strong emphasis in the commons literature on a related but distinct conflict, that which opposes the commoners to the movement of enclosures. I will argue, however, that this conflict is not of an agonistic nature and does little to preserve the dynamism and the constant self-criticism proper to the radical democrat regime. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Utility and Morality: Adam Smith's Critique of Hume Marie A. Martin Reading Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments one cannot help but note that, in spite ofthe obvious similarities between Smith and Hume and the equally obvious borrowings and adaptions Smith makesofportions of Hume's theory, the two differ substantially on the role of utility in morality. The difference is, in fact, practically diametrical opposition. Hume believed that utility was the (...) "foundation of the chief part of morals." Smith, on the other hand, believed that, while utility may contribute an additional beauty to virtue, it is never the source oftheir virtue and rarely the source of moral approbation. Given their agreement in so many other respects, why the difference regarding utility? To answer this question I shall examine both Smith's specific criticisms ofHume regarding the role ofutility in morals and his more general objections to any theory that makes an appeal to utility a foundation ofmoral approval. I shall show that, while Smith does raise anumber ofgenuine difficulties for Hume's theory, he does not succeed in his most serious criticism, that is, that Hume's theory does not adequately capture the essentially social nature ofmorality. Hume's View ofthe Role ofUtility AccordingtoHume, the sentimentofmoral approbation arisesfrom the perception ofqualities ofcharacter or mind which are either useful or agreeable to ourselves or others. Examples of qualities agreeable to ourselves include cheerfulness, confidence, self-respect, and taste. Examples of qualities agreeable to others include manners, wit, eloquence, andmodesty. But themajorityofourmoral sentiments arise from the perception of the usefulness of qualities, that is, "from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particularpersons."2 Utility or usefulness is nothing but a tendency to a certain end. But, Hume claims, "itis acontradictioninterms, thatany thingpleases as means to an end, where the end itself no wise affects us" (E 219). Thus, ifwe approve ofthose qualities thathave a tendency to promote the happiness or well-being of either the possessor or others, it must be eitherbecause we value theirhappinessin itselforbecause we value it as a means to our own interests. Volume XVI Number 2 107 MARIE A. MARTIN Hume rejects the second alternative as contrary to experienced fact. The "selfish systems" which attempt to reduce all moral approbation to self-interest cannot account for our praise and admiration ofthe courage and fortitude ofour enemies even when their consequences thwart our own interests. Neither can such systems account for the fact that "[w]e frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty ofimagination would not discover any appearance ofself-interest" (E 215-16). If it is not self-interest that leads us to approve useful qualities, thenitis clear that"[w]e must adopt amore public affection, and allow, that the interests ofsocietyare not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us" (E 219). We approve of qualities that promote the well-being of others because we have a natural concern for their welfare. In general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, every thing still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness. (E 221) Thus, our approval of useful qualities rests on their tendency to promote the happiness of those who possess or are affected by them, and this, in turn, rests on sympathy, the communication of passions, whereby we "feel" for others—happiness for theirjoys, sorrow for their miseries. So, althoughtheutilityofqualitiesofcharacteris notthe solecause ofour approbation, it is the most extensive and important one. It appears tobe matter offact, that the circumstance oíutility, in all subjects, is a source ofpraise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit ofactions: That it is the sole source ofthat high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is the foundation ofthe chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures. (E... (shrink)

The method of Ramsey sentences has been proposed for handling theoretical constructs within a scientific system. Essentially it consists of constructing a certain "monolithic" sentence for an entire theory. In this present paper several improvements are suggested which help to overcome some of the awkward features of the method. In particular we have here many Ramsey sentences rather than just one, each erstwhile primitive theoretical term giving rise to a Ramsey sentence. Such a sentence in effect defines what we call (...) a Ramsey constant. Using Ramsey constants, we attempt to improve the method in important logical and semantical respects. It is suggested also that such constants are of interest for the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Martin Sand and Luca Chiapperino find in the concept of serendipity a versatile umbrella term to reassess their previous work on moral luckLuck (also, Epistemic Luck, Moral Luck) and collectiveCollectiveresponsibilityResponsibility. Moral luck supposedly occurs when someone receives praise or blame for things beyond control. Given the ubiquity of luckLuck (also, Epistemic Luck, Moral Luck), this seems to be a seriously disquieting aspect of ordinary morality. The rewards and recognition for serendipitous discoveries fall into exactly this category. That is: more (...) than the intentions, actions, and characters of scientists matters for discoveries to obtain, just as in cases of moral luckLuck (also, Epistemic Luck, Moral Luck) something beyond morality affectsAffect our moral judgments. Even if a theoretical way of resolving the conceptual ambiguities that underlie this debate were found, there remain practical questions of how to perform stratification in science and innovationInnovation in ways that both hinge on, and yet refrain from, considerations of desert and achievement. With the example of Edward Jenner’sJenner, EdwardluckLuck (also, Epistemic Luck, Moral Luck)- and serendipity-infused discoveryDiscovery (also, Scientific Discovery) of vaccination, the authors attempt to better understand the intricate valueValue trade-offs that underlie stratification policies in science, which have to be constantly re-negotiated to maintain their legitimacy. Thereby, Sand and Ciapperino aim to take a bold step towards understanding the ethicsEthics of serendipity. (shrink)

We present two finitely axiomatized modal propositional logics, one betweenTandS4 and the other an extension ofS4, which are incomplete with respect to the neighbourhood or Scott-Montague semantics.Throughout this paper we are referring to logics which contain all the classical connectives and only one modal connective □ (unary), no propositional constants, all classical tautologies, and which are closed under the rules of modus ponens (MP), substitution, and the rule RE (fromA↔Binfer αA↔ □B). Such logics are calledclassicalby Segerberg [6]. Classical logics which (...) contain the formula □p∧ □q→ □(p∧q) (denoted byK) and its “converse,” □{p∧q)→ □p∧ □q(denoted byR) are called regular;regularlogics which are closed under the rule of necessitation, RN (fromAinfer □A), are callednormal. The logics that we are particularly concerned with are all normal, although some of our results will be true for all regular or all classical logics. It is well known thatKandRand closure under RN imply closure under RE and also that normal logics are also those logics closed under RN and containing □{p→q) → {□p→ □q). (shrink)

A role of perirhinal cortex (PrC) in recognition memory for objects has been well established. Contributions of parahippocampal cortex (PhC) to this function, while documented, remain less well understood. Here, we used fMRI to examine whether the organization of item-based recognition memory signals across these two structures is shaped by object category, independent of any difference in representing episodic context. Guided by research suggesting that PhC plays a critical role in processing landmarks, we focused on three categories of objects that (...) differ from each other in their landmark suitability as confirmed with behavioral ratings (buildings > trees > aircraft). Participants made item-based recognition-memory decisions for novel and previously studied objects from these categories, which were matched in accuracy. Multi-voxel pattern classification revealed category-specific item-recognition memory signals along the long axis of PrC and PhC, with no sharp functional boundaries between these structures. Memory signals for buildings were observed in the mid to posterior extent of PhC, signals for trees in anterior to posterior segments of PhC, and signals for aircraft in mid to posterior aspects of PrC and the anterior extent of PhC. Notably, item-based memory signals for the category with highest landmark suitability ratings were observed only in those posterior segments of PhC that also allowed for classification of landmark suitability of objects when memory status was held constant. These findings provide new evidence in support of the notion that item-based memory signals for objects are not limited to PrC, and that the organization of these signals along the longitudinal axis that crosses PrC and PhC can be captured with reference to landmark suitability. (shrink)

Dewey provides a useful analysis of what he calls historic liberalism and an interesting version of liberalism. A doctrine that he believes is useful for his time. This is a reconstituted liberalism with a holistic approach to society and nature. Dewey's “transactional” approach sees the fault of traditional liberalism as separating the individual as an entity outside an evolving social and natural context. This doctrine, while attending to greater individual freedom like all liberalism, emphasizes cooperation in a constantly evolving context (...) guided by and modelled upon science. (shrink)

In Groenendijk & Stokhof [1989] a system of dynamic predicate logic (DPL) was developed, as a compositional alternative for classical discourse representation theory (DRT ). DPL shares with DRT the restriction of being a first-order system. In the present paper, we are mainly concerned with overcoming this limitation. We shall define a dynamic semantics for a typed language with λ-abstraction which is compatible with the semantics DPL specifies for the language of first-order predicate logic. We shall propose to use this (...) new logical system as the semantic component of a Montague-style grammar (referred to as dynamic Montague grammar, DMG), which will enable us to extend the compositionality of DPL to the subsentential level. Furthermore, we shall extend this analysis also in this sense that we shall add new, dynamic interpretations for logical constants which in DPL were treated in a static fashion. This will substantially increase the descriptive coverage of DMG. (shrink)

In these times of rapid change and constant upheaval, can we learn to think and communicate more effectively-at home, in school, on the job, and as citizens of the larger world? This book (like its predecessor Sensible Thinking for Turbulent Times), which is based on the formulations of general semantics, says yes, yes, and yes! Topics in it include practical ways to improve your thinking ability, emotional self-management, understanding of the media, and analysis of important social issues.

Recent empirical findings from social psychology, ecological psychology, and embodied cognitive science indicate that situational factors crucially shape the course of human behavior. For instance, it has been shown that finding a dime, being under the influence of an authority figure, or just being presented with food in easy reach often influences behavior tremendously. These findings raise important new questions for the philosophy of action: Are these findings a threat to classical conceptions of human agency? Are humans passively pushed around (...) by situational factors, or are there agential aspects in the way we spontaneously experience and react to situations? How can one conceptualize the pervasive influence of situational factors on human action? What are situations in the first place, and how should the influence of these situations on action be thought of? This paper sets out to develop a new conceptual repertoire for thinking about the influence of situations on action, drawing on research from ecological psychology as well as from embodied and enactive cognitive science. The key proposal is the development of a philosophical sensorimotor account of agency: Action, it is proposed, should be conceived of as constant dynamical interaction of agential and environmental factors – factors which should all be conceptualized in new ways. (shrink)

Increasing returns to scale is an area in economics that has recently become the focus of much attention. While most firms operate under constant or decreasing return to scale on their relevant range of production, some firms produce goods or services with a technology which exhibits increasing returns to scale at levels of production which are large relative to the market. These goods are an important component of economic activity in a modern economy and are typically commodities produced either (...) by a public sector or, as in the U.S., by regulated utilities. In this study, the author analyzes increasing returns using general equilibrium theory to take into account the interactions between production in the public and the private sector, and the effects of financing the public sector on the redistribution of income. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Social workers must often decide whether a child, at possible risk from its parents, should be removed from home. Each year some children, left at home, are abused or killed. If the procedures have been duly followed, is a bad result to be put down to incompetence or to bad luck, and, if to the latter, does that cancel moral responsibility? We examine the claim that the case is one of ‘moral luck’ and argue that the system licences greater (...) risk than is morally justified. This is because it embodies conflicting imperatives of welfare and justice. Anyone who becomes a social worker must face a constant risk to moral integrity [1]. (shrink)

Among Carl Schmitt's most notable and controversial contributions to political theory was his claim that “all the significant concepts of the modern doctrine of the state are secularized theological concepts.” First formulated in 1922 in his Political Theology, this contention remained constant throughout his long career, as evidenced by its return in his Political Theology II, published in 1970. Here Schmitt's Cadtholic background was clearly apparent, for in so arguing, he was recapitulating the familiar topos of biblical prefiguration in (...) which the New Testament was understood as realizing the latent meaning of the Old. Viewing modern politics as merely the secularized version of a prior theology allowed Schmitt to develop his strong notion of the sovereign as a profane divinity with virtually all of the omnipotent attributes of its alleged sacred predecessor. (shrink)

This article presents an instructive example of cultural interaction between Iran and Germany at the end of the 19th century: the movement of the “Lutheran Nestorians”. A group of Eastern Syriac priests from the Urmia region in Northwest Iran came to Germany to pursue their theological formation at Lutheran institutions, whereafter they returned to Iran and continued to work, albeit within the parameters of a complex relationship, with their Mother Church. Although the initial purpose and intention of the priests’ decision (...) to come to Germany is obscure, the influence of their cultural experience in the West is clear. Specifically, Western values and habits formed the perspective with which they assessed the cultural development of Iran after their return to their native land. The priests constantly had to balance their orientation toward the West with their personal and intellectual connection to their home tradition; how difficult this situation was becomes apparent in their endeavor to redefine Eastern Syriac heritage by means of Lutheran theology. These priests made an important contribution to the cultural exchange between both countries even though they lived in manifold tensions. Thus, the “Lutheran Nestorians” can be perceived as exponents of a “bipolar” way of life, since they felt they belonged to two cultures. Their stories indicate that the antagonism between East and West, Orient and Occident is too simple to cover the complexities of history. (shrink)

Når man går i gang med et forskningsprojekt, vil der typisk være nogle forskningsetiske problemstillinger, man skal forholde sig til. Det kan fx være, at man skal have indhentet informeret samtykkeerklæringer fra de deltagere, der skal være med, eller man skal have indhentet forskningsetiske tilladelser og godkendelser fra uafhængige instanser. Det er altså overvejelser, som typisk dukker op ved begyndelsen af et forskningsprojekt. Der kan efterfølgende være en risiko for, at man forsømmer refleksioner over emergerende etiske problemstillinger, og at forskningsetik (...) således reduceres til, at man som forsker har underskrevet og overholdt nogle prædefinerede retningslinjer for god forskningspraksis. Sådanne retningslinjer er naturligvis særdeles vigtige. Men det er pointen i denne artikel, at de ikke kan stå alene. Forskningsetiske dilemmaer er et epistemologisk vilkår gennem hele forskningsprocessen, og de må således overvejes og genovervejes, forhandles og genforhandles gennem hele forskningsprocessen. Den form for forskningsetik, der følger bestemte på forhånd fastlagte retningslinjer, som typisk er formuleret i standardiserede, kontekstuafhængige principper for god etisk adfærd, benævnes i artiklen procedural forskningsetik, mens en forskningsetik, der foretager en konkret og kontekstafhængig vurdering af de specifikke etiske problemstillinger og dilemmaer, som de viser sig i praksis gennem hele forskningsprocessen, benævnes kasuistisk forskningsetik. Distinktionen mellem disse to typer forskningsetik er udtryk for en teoretisk konstruktion, og de skal ikke betragtes som modsatrettede alternativer, men derimod som supplerende sider ved god forskningsetisk praksis. I artiklen diskuteres forholdet mellem dem for ad den vej at fremhæve enhver forskers pågående og kontinuerlige ansvar gennem hele forskningsprocessen. Nøgleord: forskningsetik, procedural, kasuistisk, Leibniz English summary: Dic cur hic – a casuistic research ethic When embarking on a research project, researchers must customarily confront some ethical issues. To begin with, they may need informed consent from the participants, or research ethics permission and approval from an independent Research Ethics Committee. However, there is more involved than these legal requirements alone, for just complying with some pre-defined guidelines for good research practice is by no means enough. In fact, a number of ethical issues demanding thorough reflection may emerge during the research project. Far from being neglected, such questions deserve careful attention. Research ethical dilemmas are an epistemological condition throughout the whole research process, and must therefore be constantly considered and reviewed, negotiated and renegotiated. This article purports to categorize the ethical issues likely to arise during the course of an investigation into two main types, namely procedural and casuistic. The kind of research ethics following certain pre-established guidelines, which are typically expressed in standardized, context-independent principles of good ethical behavior, will be labeled as procedural research ethics, while the type of research ethics ensuing from the analysis and contextual assessment of the specific dilemmas arising in practice in the particular situation studied, will be named casuistic research ethics. A distinction between these two types of research ethics reflects a theoretical construct. Both types should not be regarded as opposing alternatives, but as complementary aspects of good ethical research practices. This article discusses the relationship between the two types in order to highlight the researcher’s ongoing and continuous responsibility throughout the research process. (shrink)

This article opens up a dialogue between two strands of Luther research, which until now have had limited contact: a German strand interested in the influence of Luther’s mystical education on his Reformation theology, and a German and Anglo-American strand concerned with Luther’s doctrine of the three estates and understanding of politics, emphasising in particular God’s constant activity in our daily life. This article has a twofold aim: first, to undertake a historical reconstruction of the influence of mysticism on (...) the late Luther, and second to draw some systematic conclusions for our contemporary situation. The conclusion emphasises that the mystical tradition helps us to gain a better understanding of God’s manifold present activities, namely, because it helps us to perceive that God does not work through spoken words alone, but also through gestures, gazes and other embodied activities. (shrink)

Moral deliberation involves a constant interplay among specific judgments, general moral values and principles, and background beliefs about the world. We may also construct broad moral theories to explain how our judgments and general commitments hang together, but there is little hope of settling on any one comprehensive moral theory.

En medio del constante replanteo que la filosofía y las ciencias humanas en general han venido haciendo de nociones básicas como la de 'existencia', un horizonte de planteo intercultural permitirá acoger mejor las demandas de las sociedades contemporáneas cruzadas por diferentes centros histórico-culturales y por el fenómeno común de los movimientos sociales exigiendo cada uno reconocimiento de sus propios derechos. Se concibe tal planteo como una 'odisea de la libertad', ya que intenta perseguir el difícil camino de la libertad -en (...) tanto poder ser- hacia la realización de sí mismo, en relación al reconocimiento de sí y de los otros, en el ámbito comunitario y político. Sin olvidar la buena relación con la naturaleza y el cosmos y con lo que trasciende a cada realidad, en tanto abrigo de infinitud en el ámbito artístico y religioso. Se advierte entonces que el camino a la libertad atraviesa todo tipo de dificultades. Amid the constant reconsideration of basic notions such as "existence" by philosophy and human sciences, an intercultural proposal will give a better response to the demands of contemporary societies, which are crossed by different historical-cultural centers and by the common phenomenon of social movements claiming for their own rights. Such proposal is conceived as "an odyssey of freedom", since it pursues the hard path of freedom-as possibility to be-towards his own realization and regarding his own and others' acknowledgement in the community and political sphere, not forgetting the good relationship with nature and the cosmos and with what transcends each reality, as a shelter of infinity in the artistic and religious field. It is then noticed that the path to freedom undergoes all kinds of difficulties. (shrink)

'There is something absolute about the letters between you & me; … The letter is a form of communion of the soul-spirit – … one that is faded & yet unimpeded, complete’, wrote Martin Heidegger to his fiancée Elfride Petri shortly before their wedding. In the course of a marriage that lasted almost sixty years Martin and Elfride were often apart, and the letter thus remained a vital means of communication right through to the final years. The letters (...) he sent her are snapshots of the ups and downs, the crises and everyday minutiae from Heidegger’s life: their engagement, the building of the Cabin at Todtnauberg, the part he played in the two world wars, the difficulties of his early professional career, their financial problems, his dealings with women, and his constant concern with expounding his ideas. Apart from three letters now in the hands of the German Literature Archive in Marbach, Elfride Heidegger kept all of the countless letters and cards from her husband locked away in a wooden chest. After reading them one final time, in 1977 she gave the key to this chest to her granddaughter Gertrud Heidegger on condition that she should not open it until after Elfride’s death. After years spent deciphering, transcribing and ordering the letters with the help of her father and her uncle, Gertrud Heidegger has here made a selection of them available to the public and added a commentary that provides relevant background material. This selection from the many letters written by Martin Heidegger to his wife provides an invaluable insight into their life together, their friendships and relationships, and sheds fresh light on the ideas and beliefs of one of the twentieth century’s greatest philosophers. (shrink)

LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is a remote sensing technology. It needs no ambient light, nor the guidance of the human eye to capture and reproduce a likeness of the world around us. Although LiDAR generates a constant stream of technical literature, LiDAR images, once envisaged for their aesthetic and expressive value, seem to call for alternative modes of analysis. How do we approach the fast-expanding archive of scanner images? How do we adequately describe the intriguing, spectral visualizations that (...) its blind process of recording produces? Following a general introduction, I look at Anouk De Clerk’s filmThing(2013), a work entirely comprised of LiDAR images. De Clerk encourages us to envisage LiDAR counterintuitively, not as the product of technological novelty, but as part of an interdisciplinary history of the arts. (shrink)

'There is something absolute about the letters between you & me; … The letter is a form of communion of the soul-spirit – … one that is faded & yet unimpeded, complete’, wrote Martin Heidegger to his fiancée Elfride Petri shortly before their wedding. In the course of a marriage that lasted almost sixty years Martin and Elfride were often apart, and the letter thus remained a vital means of communication right through to the final years. The letters (...) he sent her are snapshots of the ups and downs, the crises and everyday minutiae from Heidegger’s life: their engagement, the building of the Cabin at Todtnauberg, the part he played in the two world wars, the difficulties of his early professional career, their financial problems, his dealings with women, and his constant concern with expounding his ideas. Apart from three letters now in the hands of the German Literature Archive in Marbach, Elfride Heidegger kept all of the countless letters and cards from her husband locked away in a wooden chest. After reading them one final time, in 1977 she gave the key to this chest to her granddaughter Gertrud Heidegger on condition that she should not open it until after Elfride’s death. After years spent deciphering, transcribing and ordering the letters with the help of her father and her uncle, Gertrud Heidegger has here made a selection of them available to the public and added a commentary that provides relevant background material. This selection from the many letters written by Martin Heidegger to his wife provides an invaluable insight into their life together, their friendships and relationships, and sheds fresh light on the ideas and beliefs of one of the twentieth century’s greatest philosophers. (shrink)

Human monoclonal antibodies are extremely difficult to obtain by hybridoma technology. As an alternative, ‘human‐like’ antibodies have been produced by recombinant DNA technology. The first such engineered antibodies consisted of chimaeric proteins, in which murine variable regions were linked to human constant regions. More recently ‘human’ antibodies have been ‘reshaped’ by transplanting the binding site of a murine antibody into a human antibody. Further‐more antibodies have been dissected into groups of domains (Fab's, Fc's) and for example, Fab's have been (...) joined to enzymes resulting in antibody‐enzyme chimaeras. In addition to their potential clinical applications, engineered antibodies will prove invaluable in studies of structure/function relationships of variable and constant regions. (shrink)

El pensamiento estético ha sido una constante en la tradición filosófica española contemporánea, y seguramente no ha sido por casualidad. Podemos preguntarnos por qué. Como es sabido, nuestro pensamiento durante el siglo XX ha tenido como uno de sus principales focos de atención «lo vital» o, mejor dicho, la integración de razón y vida: desde el gran paso que supuso el raciovitalismo orteguiano, la preocupación por este tema ha sido una constante entre nuestros autores. Con su pensamiento Ortega se une (...) a una tradición de autores como Schopenhauer, Nietzsche o Bergson, en la que se pone de manifiesto cómo es preciso pensar en diversos modos de ejercer la razón al meramente conceptual o teorético. Esta nueva dimensión se encuentra vinculada al ámbito de lo estético. Así, lo estético deja de ser únicamente una reflexión sobre el arte y la belleza, para erigirse en un modo diverso de acceso a lo real, tal y como se puede apreciar en el mismo Ortega, en d’Ors, Zambrano... y Zubiri, quien con su inteligencia sentiente lleva a su máxima expresión —a mi modo de ver— el acceso estético a la realidad, tal y como explica en sus breves «Reflexiones filosóficas sobre lo estético». (shrink)

ABSTRACT Radical democracy was, at its inception, a polemical alternative to the hegemony of Marxism over the political discourse of the Left. This is particularly striking in the work of two of its figureheads, Miguel Abensour and Chantal Mouffe. Whereas C. Mouffe advocates for radical democracy to break free from the rigidness and the determinacy of Marxism, M. Abensour goes back to the young Marx’s plea for a “real democracy”. It results in radical democrats locating differently the radicality of their (...) approaches. While post-Marxists emphasize the crucial and dynamic role of divisive conflicts within the political community and consequently grant the State a role as their arbitrator, “Young Marxists” emphasize a constant struggle against an abusive institutionalization of the State. As a result, they advocate for a form of political spontaneity that is complicated to reconcile with consideration of the political community’s inner conflicts. The regrouping of disparate critical works under a single label makes us shortsighted to some of its internal contradictions. (shrink)

Documento recente do Ministério da Educação aponta para a construção da identidade desse curso como sendo etapa final que compõe a educação básica e sinalizando a busca constante pela superação da dualidade considerada histórica entre formação geral e profissionalização. Entretanto, o mesmo documento reconhece que essa contradição ainda se faz presente na realidade educacional brasileira e, em alguns momentos, afirma a necessidade de uma educação integrada e em outros reforça a profissionalização aos mais pobres que não podem esperar o Ensino (...) Superior para ingressar no mercado de trabalho. O texto a seguir busca analisar a fragmentação na identidade do atual Ensino Médio remontando a suas bases históricas, a do partir dos textos de Nunes e Souza que acabam por reforçar a conclusão de que os dilemas em torno da questão “formação geral e formação profissional” ainda não foram totalmente superados, apesar dos apontamentos dos documentos legais. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that knowledge in health care is a multidimensional dynamic construct, in contrast to the prevailing idea of knowledge being an objective state. Polanyi demonstrated that knowledge is personal, that knowledge is discovered, and that knowledge has explicit and tacit dimensions. Complex adaptive systems science views knowledge simultaneously as a thing and a flow, constructed as well as in constant flux. The Cynefin framework is one model to help our understanding of knowledge as a personal (...) construct achieved through sense making. Specific knowledge aspects temporarily reside in either one of four domains – the known, knowable, complex or chaotic, but new knowledge can only be created by challenging the known by moving it in and looping it through the other domains. Medical knowledge is simultaneously explicit and implicit with certain aspects already well known and easily transferable, and others that are not yet fully known and must still be learned. At the same time certain knowledge aspects are predominantly concerned with content, whereas others deal with context. Though in clinical care we may operate predominately in one knowledge domain, we also will operate some of the time in the others. Medical knowledge is inherently uncertain, and we require a context-driven flexible approach to knowledge discovery and application, in clinical practice as well as in health service planning. (shrink)

Resumo: A atuação do tradutor e intérprete de língua de sinais no contexto educacional inclusivo é tema de constantes embates teóricos acerca da concepção de seu ‘papel’. Desse modo, verificam-se prescrições que delimitam suas práticas e atribuições pela caracterização de uma pretensa ‘identidade’ profissional. Na contramão disso, esse estudo tenciona um adensamento analítico acerca daquilo que é produzido na atividade interpretativo-pedagógica do intérprete educacional, fora do âmbito da ‘identidade profissional’, mas no âmbito das efetivas ações produzidas pela posição e contextos (...) de ensino, assumidos na prática cotidiana. Assim, entende-se que essa função interpretativa se constitui na lógica da ‘diferença’, pela ativação relacional e pedagógica com o sujeito surdo no contexto escolar. A tese empreendida é a de que a função pedagógica do intérprete educacional é estabelecida como efeito do ato educativo. Nosso foco se dará na análise do aprender surdo e sua co-construção de conhecimento, produzidos com e pelos signos emitidos pelo intérprete educacional como efeito do acontecimento educativo. Portanto, cabe neste artigo, analisar o movimento conceitual da posição-mestre a partir dos estudos da hermenêutica do sujeito, em Michel Foucault, sendo ela articuladora da função interpretativo-pedagógica do intérprete educacional que se materializa no e pelo contexto de ensino. Palavras-chave: Intérprete educacional; Libras; Posição-mestre. The role of the educational interpreter and deaf learning: an analysis of the master position in the educational relationship in an inclusive classroom Abstract: Sign language translators and interpreter’s part within inclusive education constantly rises theoretical debates about the conception of their 'role'. Thus, we commonly see prescriptions that delimit their practices and attributions by characterizing a supposed professional "identity". Nevertheless, this study aims to analyze what is produced in the interpretive-pedagogical activity of the educational interpreter, beyond the scope of 'professional identity', and within the effective actions produced by the position and context assumed on a daily basis. Thus, we understand that this interpretative function is constituted in the logic of 'difference', by relational and pedagogical activation with the deaf subject in the school context. The thesis undertaken is that the pedagogical function of the educational interpreter is established as an effect of the educational act. We focus on the analysis of deaf learning and its co-construction of knowledge, produced with and by the signs emitted by the educational interpreter as an effect of the educational event. Therefore, this article analyzes the conceptual movement of the master position from the studies of the hermeneutics of the subject, in Michel Foucault, assuming it as an articulator of the interpretative-pedagogical function of the educational interpreter that materializes in and through the teaching context. Keywords: Educational interpreter; Libras; Master position. El papel del intérprete educativo y el aprendizaje de los sordos: un análisis de la posición del maestro en la relación educativa en un aula inclusiva Resumen: El papel de los traductores e intérpretes de lengua de señas en la educación inclusiva suscita constantemente debates teóricos sobre la concepción de su "papel". Es habitual ver prescripciones que delimitan sus prácticas y atribuciones caracterizando una supuesta "identidad" profesional. Sin embargo, este estudio pretende analizar lo que se produce en la actividad interpretativa-pedagógica del intérprete educativo, más allá del ámbito de la "identidad profesional", y dentro de las acciones efectivas producidas por la posición y el contexto asumidos cotidianamente. Así, entendemos que esta función interpretativa se constituye en la lógica de la 'diferencia', por la activación relacional y pedagógica con el sujeto sordo en el contexto escolar. La tesis es que la función pedagógica del intérprete educativo se establece como efecto del acto educativo. Nos centramos en el análisis del aprendizaje de los sordos y su co-construcción del conocimiento, producido con y por los signos emitidos por el intérprete educativo como efecto del acto educativo. Para esto, este artículo analiza el movimiento conceptual de la posición de maestro desde los estudios de la hermenéutica del sujeto, en Michel Foucault, asumiéndola como articuladora de la función interpretativa-pedagógica del intérprete educativo que se materializa en y a través del contexto docente. Palabras clave: Intérprete educativo; Libras; Puesto de maestro. Data de registro: 06/07/2022 Data de aceite: 26/10/2022. (shrink)

Which concept is the more primitive when it comes to the functioning of the logical constants: representation or inference? Via a discussion of Arthur Prior’s famous mock connective “tonk” and a couple of responses to Prior by J. T. Stevenson and Nuel Belnap, it is argued that early Wittgenstein’s answer is neither. Instead, he takes representation and inference to be equally basic and mutually dependent notions. The nature and significance of this mutual dependence is made clear by an investigation into (...) the Tractarian notion of a proposition. It is further argued that even if Wittgenstein later abandoned the Tractarian conception of what a proposition is, he never gave up the idea that inference and representation play interdependent and equally fundamental roles in logic. (shrink)

Las torsiones del pensamiento foucaulteano permiten señalar la remisión a la historia como una constante. La apuesta de Foucault por el modo de indagación genealógico se inscribe en la pretensión de extender su campo de investigaciones hacia los vínculos entre el saber y las relaciones de poder. Desde un abordaje que considere el pensamiento político de Foucault, este artículo postula la posibilidad de comprender a la genealógica como un uso político de la historia. De este modo, la pretensión es señalar (...) no sólo la ruptura de la genealogía foucaulteana respecto de la historia teleológica, sino caracterizarla como un modo de intervención política en la construcción del sentido histórico que busca escenificar la comprensión de la historia como emergente de un enfrentamiento belicoso. Así, la disputa por el dominio de la historia efectiva se encuadra dentro de la “hipótesis Nietzsche” del poder, que lo explica a partir de las relaciones de fuerzas. La incidencia política de la genealogía se verifica en la insurrección y desujeción de los saberes históricos populares, que ponen a la política en un lugar central. (shrink)

This article aims to classify those reducts of expansions of (Q, <) by unary predicates which eliminate quantifiers, and in particular to show that, up to interdefinability, there are only finitely many for a given language. Equivalently, we wish to classify the closed subgroups of Sym(Q) containing the group of all automorphisms of (Q, <) fixing setwise certain subsets. This goal is achieved for expansions by convex predicates, yielding expansions by constants as a special case, and for the expansion by (...) a dense, co-dense predicate. Partial results are obtained in the general setting of several dense predicates. (shrink)

O trabalho que aqui se propões tem por objetivo analisar as obras de Immanuel Kant buscando sintetizar suas contribuições para a compreensão da filosofia enquanto atitude filosófica, num diálogo com as pedagogias ativas, bem como refletir sobre os métodos para o seu ensino. A pesquisa partirá de um viés bibliográfico a fim de trazer os conceitos de autonomia e esclarecimento para uma reflexão sobre os métodos adequados para o despertar de uma consciência filosófica. Embora distante de sua finalidade, a educação (...) deve manter-se em constante busca por melhorias, pelo desenvolvimento da humanidade em todas as suas esferas. (shrink)

Chapter 1 constitutes an introduction to Gentzen calculi from two perspectives, logical and philosophical. It introduces the notion of generalisations of Gentzen sequent calculus and the discussion on properties that characterize good inferential systems. Among the variety of Gentzen-style sequent calculi, I divide them in two groups: syntactic and semantic generalisations. In the context of such a discussion, the inferentialist philosophy of the meaning of logical constants is introduced, and some potential objections – mainly concerning the choice of working with (...) semantic generalizations – are addressed. Finally, I’ll introduce the case studies that I’ll be dealing with in part II. Chapter 2 is concerned with the origins and development of Jaśkowski’s discussive logic. The main idea of this chapter is to systematize the various stages of the development of discussive logic related researches from two different angles, i.e., its connections to modal logics and its proof theory, by highlighting virtues and vices. Chapter 3 focuses on the Gentzen-style proof theory of discussive logic, by providing a characterization of it in terms of labelled sequent calculi. Chapter 4 deals with the Gentzen-style proof theory of relevant logics, again by employing the methodology of labelled sequent calculi. This time, instead of working with a single logic, I’ll deal with a whole family of them. More precisely, I’ll study in terms of proof systems those relevant logics that can be characterised, at the semantic level, by reduced Routley-Meyer models, i.e., relational structures with a ternary relation between states and a unique base element. Chapter 5 investigates the proof theory of a modal expansion of intuitionistic propositional logic obtained by adding an ‘actuality’ operator to the connectives. This logic was introduced also using Gentzen sequents. Unfortunately, the original proof system is not cut-free. This chapter shows how to solve this problem by moving to hypersequents. Chapter 6 concludes the investigations and discusses the future of the research presented throughout the dissertation. (shrink)

One of the protagonists of the darwinist controversy in the Canary Islands (Spain), during the Nineteenth Century, was the advocate and teacher Rafael Lorenzo y García. In this paper, I show his original thought, until now unknown, against the classical darwinism and next to the fixism.Moreover I analyse the philosophical and natural constants in his Estudios filosóficos (1876 y 1877).

In his book SEXUAL DESIRE, Roger Scruton wrongly maintains that human sexual experience is essential intentional. His thesis depends on his highly revisionary definition of 'sexual desire', the artificial nature of which I expose and criticise. He admits that homosexual desire is capable of the same kind of intentionality as heterosexual desire, and is therefore not intrinsically obscene or perverted, but he advances reasons why homosexuality is morally different from heterosexuality and is therefore an object of disapproval. His arguments presuppose (...) 'an impassable moral divide' between the sexes, and are, on his own admission, not very cogent. Since he allows that homosexual desire is a natural and spontaneous phenomenon and also proposes that moral education should guide us towards a state in which our sexuality is entirely integrated within a life of personal affection and responsibility, consistency requires that he adopt a sexual ideology which does not discriminate against homosexuality. For homosexuals are unlikely to achieve the 'sexual integrity' which Scruton advocates (and which I endorse) if they are constantly encouraged to disparage their own sexual nature and if social institutions make no positive provision for them. (shrink)

In this paper we will try to show how Gabriel Marcel understands the junction between the self and the other as appears in his reflections on the opposition freedom-gift, on his critique of Sartre’s philosophy of freedom, and on metaphysical implications of love. These three approaches point out a way that leads to understand man’s tension between selfhood and alterity, in the heart of a fundamental communion which refer, ultimately, to the divine. Therefore, metaphysical and religious discourses are constantly crossing (...) but, instead of revoking value to Marcel’s philosophy, this double rapport teaches us a way of attending religious symbols and testimonies in order to get close to the meaning of human experience. (shrink)

Preface The status of sovereignty as a highly ambiguous concept is well established. Pointing out or deploring, the ambiguity of the idea has itself become a recurring motif in the literature on sovereignty. As the legal theorist and international lawyer Alf Ross put it, “there is hardly any domain in which the obscurity and confusion is as great as here.” 1 The concept of sovereignty is often seen as a downright obstacle to fruitful conceptual analysis, carried over from its proper (...) setting in history to “plague and befog contemporary thought.” 2 . . . So contested is the concept that, rather than pursuing the contestation, many political theorists think we should give up so protean a notion. Granting that the debate on the relevance of sovereignty frustratingly oscillates between claims that it will either continue to exist or that it is about to disappear, forgetting it altogether, and thereby escaping this seemingly endless argument, can easily appear as the most urgent task for political theory . The following argument makes a case that the “urgent task” is not the abandonment of the concept of sovereignty, but an understanding of its essential philosophical nature as an integrated and evolving expression of practical reason. Sovereignty is neither ambiguous nor obscure once its fundamental presuppositions are laid bare and its many philosophical and historical manifestations shown to be the product, in actuality, of a single, dialectally dynamic but integrated set of metaphysical elements. This is the first of three arguments describing the evolution of international law as a manifestation of practical reason through an application of philosophical method to the source , locus , and scope of the concept of sovereignty. It moves from a dialectic balance favoring utility to a balance dominated by legal right to a dialectic of duty to humanity and nature. All three arguments are meant to be a contribution to the new field of International Legal Philosophy as defined by Phillip Allott. 4 This field combines a sensitivity to legal practice with an effort to understand the underlying philosophical determinants of empirical choice and behavior. One purpose of international legal philosophy is to “remove” from the minds of those who study the law what Diderot defined as “the sophism of the ephemeral,” and what Allott calls “the disempowering idea that what xii Preface happens to exist now is inevitable and permanent.” 5 A core imperative is to “reunderstand what it is to be a thinking being” 6 and to rediscover the dialectic between the private and the public as it determines, and is redetermined by, legal practice. This requires a “revolution in the human mind” 7 so that we may transcend the current dependence on positivist methods and empirical fact as an end-in-itself, and try to understand the underlying and more constant and essential ideas and inherent dialectics that constitute the substructure or “metaphysics” of international law. I will approach this “revolution” with the use of R. G. Collingwood’s philosophical method 8 and the philosophy of David Hume, applied to international law as an expression of practical reason. The goal of philosophical method is the construction of a comprehensive policy argument (CPA) for a public policy or legal issue. In addition to the conventional use of empirical models and their logic of investigation in the study of policy and law, CPA requires that an underlying philosophical logic of concepts be deciphered to identify the ideas within the issue, and their definition, overlap, and systematic interdependence. Philosophical method is a means with which to interpret and understand competing systematic and complete conceptual logics, existing at the core of an issue and pertinent to policy change. Philosophical method is therefore not meant to be a replacement for the empirical investigation of a policy or legal issue, or the use of scientific method in social studies. Rather, it is a complimentary and prerequisite method that seeks to transcend the limitations of positivism and present a more complete understanding of the philosophical presuppositions of positivist ideas like power, interest, or strategic rationality. Philosophical method is meant to be used with the facts of the policy or legal issue to match an illuminating logic of concepts with a pertinent logic of investigation . Within the CPA, the use of philosophical method and the metaphysics of a policy or legal issue is assumed to be critical to the full understanding of the overlapping concepts, dialectics, and scale of forms that determine, and are determined by, the empirical context of the policy or legal topic. Specifically, instead of utilizing bits and pieces of various theoretical arguments to address narrowly focused empirical questions, as positivism prescribes, I will address the evolution of international law as practical reason in three phases. Each will be approached through a single integrated logic of philosophical concepts from a particular philosopher (i.e., David Hume, G. W. F. Hegel, Immanuel Kant). This philosophically holistic approach to the law is based on the assumption that only through the use of a single integrated argument in legal analysis can sovereignty, or any concept, be understood as a truly systematic and logical whole. A complete philosophical paradigm has a dialectic integrity and systematic logic that can more adequately describe the evolving essence of a concept like sovereignty. This approach also has the advantage of generating a number of distinct holistic descriptions of the law through the application of different philosophical systems, one at a time, to its factual structure. 9 Positivism does not seek Preface xiii holism, and rejects the idea that “theory” has such a characteristic. The essential or comprehensive substructure of any idea is therefore ignored in a method that recommends the observation of empirical problems through the use of whatever hodgepodge of theoretical elements is seen fit to frame its superstructure. This failure to deal with metaphysics has retarded both an essential understanding of international law as a species of legal system, and any holistic and dialectical conceptualization of its inherent concepts, like sovereignty. A second positivist convention expects modern theorists to create new theory rather than to refine and apply that of existing philosophy. This predisposition is driven by the positivist goal of discovery that ignores refinement as a possible purpose of philosophical analysis. Collingwood argues that philosophy must take that set of ideas already known and utilize existing systematic philosophical arguments to refine them so that they evolve closer to their essence as concepts. Considering this imperative, the idea of sovereignty can be assumed to have had valid usage for hundreds of years, over which time, the concept has evolved to mean different things, each a refinement of the definition that preceded it. Transcending positivism means that the scholar’s search is not for “new” material, but to decipher the metaphysical essence of a concept as it has been made manifest over time and context. These manifestations are rooted, and refined from, the known terms of that concept’s inherent idea(s). Rather than depending exclusively on positivism and its conventions, my work utilizes, in addition to Collingwood, the intact philosophical systems of Hume, Hegel, and Kant to trace the refinement of international law as a product of human practical reason. These paradigms, or integrated systems of logical concepts, will be applied to legal practice individually, so that each CPA can be deciphered separately. This provides a set of integrated and logically intact paradigms for the evolutionary stages of practical reason in international law. Because each argument is applied systematically, a deeper understanding of the source, locus, and scope in the development of law in general, and international law in particular, is possible where it is not with the application of various disconnected components of many theories. Each CPA based on Hume, Hegel, or Kant can then be used to describe a distinct context that its logic of concepts best illuminates; specifically, the (1) genesis, (2) contemporary dilemmas, and (3) future of the international legal system. By widening the perspective of international lawyers and policymakers, they can more easily perceive the dialectic of ideas that has created, and is refined by, the legal practice in which they participate. We also move toward Allott’s goal of “human self-perfecting.” 10 And, in addition, by providing a more complete knowledge of the origins of legal practice and its evolution, we illuminate the practical possibilities for what we might “choose to be” 11 in the future. To achieve this, the essential metaphysical elements of state sovereignty and its inherent evolutionary scale of forms will be deciphered and described. This will transform what appears to be a multitude of definitions and xiv Preface practical realizations of the concept of sovereignty into a set of interdependent manifestations of a single substructure, made of a single set of dialectic elements. The interpretation of international law through practical reason sorts and integrates a diverse and discordant literature and defines state sovereignty as a single concept evolving on a scale of forms that allows it to exhibit diverse character traits, all arising from different combinations of common and essential metaphysical elements. This approach, compared to positivist methods and legal realism, allows one to transcend current agreement that sovereignty is, at best, a narrowly focused set of empirical characteristics or, at worst, “organized hypocrisy.” 12 This method also encourages the scholar and practitioner to understand the predispositions and pitfalls of the concept of sovereignty, as well as its potential future paths, more effectively. The use of philosophical method to create policy paradigms out of preexisting philosophical systems and apply these to international law will be called Philosophical-Policy & Legal Design . This approach allows the use of preexisting and complete philosophical arguments that provide an adequate logic of concepts to chart the evolution of the idea of sovereignty along its scale of forms. An examination of the source of practical reason in human social convention with the employment of a philosophical-policy drawn from Hume’s logic of concepts about human nature will demonstrate this new approach. Why Hume? Because, up to now, without an adequate substructure we have arguments, like Brunne é’ s and Troope’s, 13 that may correctly identify international law as an “interactional” system, but cannot present any argument as to why it is, where this empirical reality comes from, or what its implications are for the future. Comparatively, Hume provides a logic of philosophical concepts that answers these concerns. First, he fulfills the requirements for a fuller understanding of the origin and evolution of law from social convention and the dependence of social convention on the human imperative for society. Second, he offers a more adequate delineation of the overlapping concepts of the law in terms of the ideas and institutions that deal with norms and justice (e.g., principle, process, practice, rule, power, interest). Third, he provides a fundamental understanding of the essential dialectics at the core of a conceptualization of the law with both unconscious and conscious human participation (i.e., passion. (shrink)

Over the last several decades, scholars and practitioners have progressively acknowledged that we cannot consider cities as the place where nature stops anymore, resulting in urban environments being increasingly appreciated and theorized as hybrids between nature and culture, entities made of socio-ecological processes in constant transformation. Spanning the fields of political ecology, environmental studies, and sociology, this new direction in urban theory emerged in concert with global concern for sustainability and environmental justice. This volume explores the notion that connecting (...) with nature holds the key to a more progressive and liberatory politics. (shrink)